

A Comparative Study of the thoughts of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafiyyah: Focus on Jihad Discourse

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ABSTRACT

The experience of the Muslim Ummah in the 19th and 20th centuries has given rise to various revivalist thoughts aimed at reclaiming the lost glory of Islam and returning Muslims to their right position. Despite having the common mission of revitalizing the Ummah, the two trends are always at loggerhead over pressing issues of Islam. Hence, this research focuses on the Jihād discourse as a case study for the multitudinous contention between the two trends. Library and field methodologies were used. Findings of the research show that the Muslim Brotherhood is more active in military Jihād than the current Salafiyyah group. Additionally, the rise of insurgency and militancy by some over-zeolot Muslims in the Arabia is a product of irresponsible leadership that has ultimately failed in defending the over-all interest of its people. This research further recommends that heeding the agitation of Muslims majority to install an Islamic system in Muslim nations by the leaders remains the only available means of ending the upsurge of Islamic militancy in the Muslim world.

Keywords: Comparative, Thought, Salafiyyah, Muslim Brotherhood, Jihād and Discourse.

INTRODUCTION:

The Muslim Brotherhood and *Salafiyyah* group both represent the largest revivalist trend in the current time. Addressing the mournful state of the *Ummah* is their common mission. Hence, the two trends have become the major platform for Muslims with revivalist aspiration in current time. It is worrying that despite the uniform mission and often the common source adopted by the two revivalist groups; they remain one of the most hostile and rival religious groups in recent time. Their hostility emanates from different approach adopted by each trend towards a large number of religious discourses. Notable religious discourses where the two groups have offered antithetical approach are theological matters, applying the comprehensiveness of Islam to modern world, concept and condemnation of *Bid'ah*, the concept of *Jihād*, attitude towards Islamic heritage, Islamic Mysticism, political reforms and participation, Caliphasy, relation with non-Muslims and approach to controversial matters of religion.

Against this backdrop, this research intends to compare the thought of the two groups on current *Jihād* discourses. The investigation is instructive in order to identify the link between the current upsurge of Islamic insurgency and militancy, and the concept of *Jihād* in Islamic tenets. Furthermore, it will explore the connotation of *Jihād* and its applicability to the new setting of modern world.

Historical Development of *Salafiyyah*:

The concept of *Salafiyyah* is rooted from the word: "*Salaf*". According to the various Arabic Dictionaries, *Salaf* means: Past, ancient and predecessor. (Ibn Manthūr, 2007). A survey of the usage of the word in the Qur'ān shows that it is used eight times in seven chapters with the literary meanings of past and preceding action. (See

Q2:275, Q4:22, Q4:23, Q5:95, Q78:38, Q10:30, Q69:24 and Q43:56). The Prophet prominently in his communication with his daughter, Fatimah, also used the word when he said: “And I am to you a good predecessor” (Muslim, 2003, no. 2450).

From the usage of the Qur’ān and Prophetic tradition, it is obvious that the technical meaning of the word was not intended. Hence, *Salaf*, technically means the Companions of Prophet Muhammad and all those who followed their footstep. (Bakru, 2012, p. 111). *Salafiyyah* is therefore the emulation of methodological and ideological tracks of the companions of the Prophet and of the ancient traditional scholars of Islam who also emulated the companions in their creeds. (Hilali, 2009, p. 37).

The inevitability and necessity of adopting *Salafiyyah* approach in practicing Islam was premised on the verses of the Qur’ān that testify to the honesty and piety of the Companions of Prophet Muhammad and that of those who followed their footstep. Various prophetic traditions stress the priority and preference given by the divine to the methodology and creeds of *Salaf*, commanding in turn the subsequent Muslims to follow their track in controversial time and also premised on the texts and contents of the works produced by the classical *Imams* who have lived in the second, third and fourth centuries of Islam in which attacks were launched on the contrary creeds to the aforementioned. The verses of the *Qur’ān* that testify to the piety and status of the companions include: Q48:18, Q48:29, Q9:117, Q59:8 and Q8:74.

The foregoing verses have been used by the *Salafi* adherents to establish the superiority and preference of the method followed by the *Sahābah* in professing Islam. This is because Allah as shown from the quoted verses has sanctioned their practice and behaviour. (Bakru, 2012, p. 206).

The concept of *Salafiyyah* is also premised on the prophetic tradition narrated by ‘Abdullahi bn Mas‘ūd who said: “the Apostle of Allah was asked about the best set of people? The Apostle replied: “My generation, followed by those who followed them and those who also followed their followers”. (Bukhari, 2007, no. 2533). In addition, ‘Irbād bn Sāriyah narrates that the Prophet was reported to have said: “Anyone of you who will live behind me shall witness serious controversy. Hence, (in order to spare yourself of its detriment), stick to my path and the path of the guided *Khulafāu* after me. Hold on it seriously. (Tirmidhi, 2004, 266).

In obedience to the aforementioned texts in the Qur’ān and *Sunnah*, there arose in the Muslim *Ummah* right from the formative stage of Islamic history a trend that had been using the creeds and actions of the Companions as criteria for accepting and rejecting religious practices. It is acknowledged that from the onset, those sets of people were not being referred to as *Salafis*, but their trend was never different from what later surfaced as the concept of *Salafiyyah*. (Abbāsi, 2002, p. 10). During the time of Prophet Muhammad and the reign of his Companions, there was no need to claim *Salafiyyah* because all the adherents of Islam were steadfast on the clear teachings of Prophet Muhammad and the *Ummah* was uniform on a universal trend. (Abbāsi, 2002).

The account of the historical development of *Salafiyyah* is given by Professor ‘Imārah (2011), who claimed that *Salafiyyah* has passed through three stages with different features. (p. 27). He argued that the concept as it is, emerged during the Abbasid era (Second Century of Islam) as an ultra conservative and literalist trend attacking the new evolving renaissance of Greek Philosophy in the Muslim community. The then Muslim Philosophers were notorious for rejecting the sacred texts and relying on Greek based philosophy and this forced the emergence of another trend which negated the value of reason and stressed the sacredness of textual literalism. The new trend was headed by Imam Ahmad bn Hanbali (d. 855CE) and supported by the *Muhaddithūn* (Scholars of Prophetic Tradition) namely: Ibn Rāhawayihī (d. 852CE), Bukhārī (d. 870CE), Muslim (875CE), Abu Dāūd (d. 888CE), Dārimi (d. 893CE), Tabarāni (d. 971CE) and Bayhaqi (d. 1066CE). *Salafiyyah* in this stage was characterized by literalism, conservatism and hostility to reasoning. During the time of Ibn Taymiyyah, rationalism was injected to *Salafiyyah* in the sense that he unequivocally declared that what is reasonable to a common sense will never be contradicted by authentic textual provision. He also asserted that human reason has the natural capacity to discover what is legally normal and abnormal. Further, he admitted that sound analogical judgement is among the parameters of divine justice. In this stage, *Salafiyyah* was characterized by the combination of textual provisions with sound reasoning, intellectual disposition and academic polemics. The last stage passed through by *Salafiyyah*, according to ‘Imarah, was quite influenced by the Bedouinism and harshness of the Arabian gulf from where the *Salafi* reformist, Ibn ‘Abdil Wahhāb, came.

Although, it is indisputably admitted that of those achievements of Ibn Abdil Wahhāb are the expulsion of polytheistic acts being practiced by the then Muslims, and minimizing the superstitious doctrines of the mystics, much confusion has been caused in the Muslim *Ummah* through the current *Salafiyyah* redual of challenges facing the Muslims to literal textual provisions and hostility to intellectual reasoning and modernity. Having noticed the difference in the rationalistic version of Ibn Taymiyyah *Salafiyyah* and the literalistic version of

Wahabi – Salafiyyah, Muhammad °Abduh (d. 1905CE) has advocated in the beginnings of last century for the adoption of rationalistic version of *Salafiyyah* which connotes the conception of Islam according to the patterns followed by the *Salaf* and return to the primary sources of Islam.

We are convinced with the analysis of Professor °Imarah in his account of unifying features in the stages of *Salafiyyah*, and the characteristic features in each stage. We however differ with °Imarah in his failure to connect the emergence of *Salafiyyah* in the second century of Islam to the orthodox Muslims in the preceding century namely: the Companions and their followers. This is because during the uproar that ensued among the *Muhaddithūn* headed by Imam Ahmad and the Greek Muslim Philosophers, the former were known to be defending the status quo, which was the methodology handed down to them from the *Sahābah* generation, while the latter never claimed to be with the orthodox. Hence, it is convincing that the chain of *Salafiyyah* started from the Companions, developed by the early *Muhaddithūn* in the second and third centuries, revived by Ibn Taymiyyah and his students, and finally revitalized by Ibn °AdulWahhab through whom it gains acceptance and popularity in current time. It is however worthy of mention that due to the various stages through which *Salafiyyah* passed, and consequent upon the features with which each stage is characterized, there are currently various factions of *Salafiyyah* in the Muslim world. Some are inclined to rationalistic version of *Salafiyyah* as represented by Muhammad Abduh and his student, Rashid Ridā, while some are inclined to literalistic version as being represented by the scholars of Saudi conservative *Salafiyyah*. (°Imarah, 2011).

Summarily, *Salafiyyah* is the continuation of the methodology of the companions and those who followed them. It has passed through various stages with each stage having its mark and feature on the face of *Salafiyyah*.

The Emergence of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt:

Prior to the creation of Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the Muslim world in general, and Egypt, in particular, were in a mournful state that called for urgent address. Generally, the Muslim territories apart from Saudi, Yemen and Najd, were under the colony of the west which replaced Islamic values with her own world views in philosophical, moral, social, political, economic and educational aspects.(Qardāwi,1990,p.13) . This was followed by the unprecedented tribulation in the fall of Caliphasy which then served as the only umbrella for the Muslim unity. The Muslims throughout the globe wept over the fall and various conferences aimed at strategizing ways of reclaiming the lost glory were held. The Muslims had not overcome the trauma experienced in the fall of Caliphasy when the *Ummah* was visited with another tribulation manifested in the rise of Israel state in the Muslims’ domain of Palestine. Now, there was no leadership that would speak for the *Ummah* and that would assume the forefront role in the ensuing battle. The aforementioned was the general status of the Muslim world. Coming back to Egypt which is one of the most ancient Muslim cities that have had contact with Islam in the Islamic first century during the reign of Umar bn al-Khattāb (d. 644C.E), the story is more mournful. The most ancient Islamic institution, *Al-Azhar*, was too obsessed by internal problems that made her weak in the face of overlapping challenges confronting the Muslims of Egypt. The then constituent authority had inherited from the colonial era policies aimed at barring the institution from having influence on the lives of citizens. Hence, there was no in Al-Azhar the much needed solution to the problems of the *Ummah* as Al-Azhar also staunchly was in need of messiah. The dominating Sufi groups in Egypt were not qualified to rescue the Muslims, as they had constrained Islam to mere supplication and spiritual incantation. The orbit around which the major misfortune of the Egyptian Muslims revolved was the British occupation. The history of the British occupation in Egypt started in 1882 CE. (Yusuf ,2009 ,p.53). For thirty years after that, Britain’s position was not clearly defined; all that was known was that the mantle of authority was handed over to Egyptian Army under the British Command. (p.18). People, therefore, had no other choice than to form political associations to serve as pressure groups that would eventually see to the emancipation of Egypt. The agitation gave birth to 1919 revolution of Egypt. It is worthy of note that after the acclaimed independence of Egypt, the British still controlled the political, economic and social direction of the country. Hassan al-Bannā (2011), who was a young boy during the manifestation of the aforementioned scenes provides an eye-witness account of the gravity of misfortunes brought by the British occupation to the country:

After the previous world war (1914-1918) and which was the period I stayed in Cairo, the wave of secularism had gotten deep the guise of intellectual liberalism and personal liberty. The wave of irreligiosity and permissiveness had been intensified that they were irresistible. A form tagged intellectual forum was created in manakh street. Lectures and talks which were

attacking ancient religions, were being delivered and their speakers were mixture of Muslims, Jews and Christians. Then, books journals and magazines were released to propagate the aforementioned trends which aimed at weakening the influence of religion or even at bringing it to end so that the citizenry would enjoy the true intellectual liberalism they advocated for.(p.46).

Although, not only Egypt was victim of British westernization, unlike other countries where westernization only affected their ruling or civilized class, Egypt shared the same encounter with Turkey in the sense that westernization drove out Islam entirely from the socio-political terrains and confirmed the Islamic thought to Mosques and religious gatherings.

Being a student in Dārul ‘Ulūm, an affiliate of *Al-Azhar* University, and uncomfortable with the current scene, Hasan al- Bannā thought that disseminating the teachings of Islam could not continue to be restricted to only mosques. Hence, he converged some of his mates for the task of disseminating Islam through the channels of mosques, coffee restaurants and public gatherings.(p.67). Among those who positively responded were Ustadh Muhammad Madkur, Ustadh Ahmad AbdulHamid, Shaykh Hamid ‘Askariyyah and others.(p.68). Having noticed that the citizens of Egypt had been polarized into two formidable camps namely: the westernized liberals and the Islamists, with the former having clear-cut upper-hand above the latter, Al-Bannā thought that individual efforts were too weak to tackle the wave of westernization, hence the resort to put the onus of leading the Islamist camp on the shoulders of big scholars who through the suggested collaboration with one another could mount the battles horse against the camp of the liberalists who had then constituted the largest populace of the country. He approached Shaykh Yusuf Ad-Dajawi for that assignment. The Shaykh apart from being a reputable Sūfī scholar in Egypt, also commanded much respect from the scholars and bigwigs of the Islamic camp in the country.(p.85). The Shaykh also showed his sympathy over the state of Egyptian Muslims, but gave excuse to Al-Bannā that the challenge had defied solution as *Al-Azhar* which remained the largest institution thus far, had failed in carrying out the task brought by the latter. After much deliberation and debate over the matter between Al-Bannā and the disciples of Ad-Dajawi who later accused the former of un-ethical attitude through his much persistence on convincing the Shaykh, Al-Bannā invoked the following historical admonition to Ad-Dajawi and his disciples:

My boss, terrible war is being waged against Islam to this extent and its warriors, defenders and Muslim scholars are deeprootedly passing their time in enjoyment. Do you think that Allah will not hold you responsible for that you commit? If you know for Islam, scholars and defenders other than you, then direct me to them, perhaps I may find in them what you lack?(p.73).

Shaykh Dajawi burst into weeping on hearing the foregoing admonition from a young boy in his twenty and sadly asked Al-Bannā of what to do. Hassan Al-Bannā replied that the task is simple as just to compile the list of Zealot Muslims spread across the scholars and wealthy to collaborate in publishing a weekly newspaper that would be countering that of the liberalists and to form a group that would be made up of dedicated Muslim youths. The suggestion gave birth to *Jam’iyyat ash-Shubbān al-Muslimīn* (Muslim Youths’ Society) which had as members notable scholars such as: Rashīd Ridā, Muhammad Khidr Husayn, ‘Abdul-Aziz Jāwish, AbdulWahhab an-Najjār, Muhibbudeen Khatib and host of others. It should be noted that Al-Bannā was doing all this as a final year student in Dārul ‘Ulūm. On completing his study, he was posted by the government to ‘Isma’iliyyah a village in Egypt, as a primary school teacher. Al-Bannā relocated to Isma’iliyyah with his high ambition to provide a formidable response to the current problem of the *Ummah*. It took him half of a year to keenly observe the determinants of influence in that vicinity and he discovered that the major channels of influencing the populace are four namely: the Muslim scholars, the leaders of Sufī groups, the figure personalities and places of assembly. (p.84). He decided to go for the fourth one as he had confirmed its effectiveness in *Da’wah* when he was staying in Cairo. Al-Bannā raised followers and adherents in the assembly of workers, artists and common people and in March, 1928 was visited by six of those who had been influenced by his sermons namely: Hāfith ‘AbdulHamid, Ahmad Al-Husuri, Fuād Ibrahim, ‘Abdur-Rahman Hasbullah, ‘Isma’il ‘Izzu and Zakariyya al-Maghribi, purposely to launch an organization that would reclaim the lost glory of Islam, whereby they all swore (*Bay’ah*) to Hassan Al-Bannā. The event marks the beginning of Muslim Brotherhood as seen in current time.

It is worthy of mention that the circumstances that provoked the establishment of the group are not only cumbersome, they constituted the biggest challenges confronting the Muslims. Hence, the group was to assume the responsibility of repositioning the Muslims in Egypt and in the global world. It is appealing that the personality that would bear the flag of this most needed organization at that time was just of twenty two years. This alludes to the dual facts that the then aged scholars had been incapacitated by the overlapping challenges that required the address of an extra ordinary reformer; and also indicates that with his little age at that time coupled with the attempt he made at rising to the responsibility that should had been assumed by Al-Azhar which stood out as the reference point for the *Ummah*, Hassan al-Bannā stands out as one of the most important figures and reformers in the current history of Islam. It is however debatable if with the little age and experience, Hassan al-Bannā could successfully surmount the outlined challenges of the *Ummah* or alternatively add to their gravity. This can only be settled through open-minded and objective research and investigation into the objectives, methodology and impacts of the *Jama'ah*.

Approach to *Jihād* Concept:

Jihād literally means: “to struggle”, “to exert effort”, and “to strive”. (Ibn Manthūr,2007). Technically, it refers to the increasing effort that an individual must make towards self-improvement and self purification. (*Da'wah* Institute of Nigeria ,2009). It also refers to the duty of Muslims, both at an individual and collective level, to struggle against all forms of evil, corruption, injustice, tyranny and oppression – whether it is any injustice that is committed against Muslims or Non-Muslims, and whether by Muslims or Non-Muslims. In this context, *Jihād* may include peaceful struggle or, if necessary, armed struggle.

The fore-going broad definition given to *Jihād* by modern scholars accurately reflects the conception of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* on the discourse. From the usage of the Qur'ān, the word has been used for the following meanings: intellectual struggle via the Qur'an,(Q29:6); struggle with wealth and souls(Q9:41); and struggle in searching for Allah.(Q29:69). Hence, contrary to the conventional notion of Muslims and non-Muslims alike the word was not used once for military or warfare. It is indisputable that there is also provision for warfare, but with different word, *Qitāl*. From the realms of *hadith*, the word has also been used for struggle against one's souls (Al-Albānī, 1990, no.1999); word of truth before an oppressive ruler (An-Nisāi,2005); pilgrimage for woman (Bukhāri, 2004, no. 2784) and obedience to one's parent.(Bukhāri , 2004). Even though the *Qur'ān* and *Hadith* give a variety of meanings to the term “*Jihād*” (as illustrated above), scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and law have usually been more concerned with the military form of *Jihād* as this requires more jurisprudential elaboration and legal regulation. The warfare *Jihād* has always been in the spotlight of discourse and argument in current time. Hence, our discussion in this context will be based on warfare in Islam. There is no contention among the *Salafiyah* groups and the *Ikhwān* scholars over the legality of military *Jihād* in Islam for there are express provisions for it in the Qur'ān and *Hadith*. (Q2:190; Q9:12-3; Q22:39-40 and Q4:75). They however differed with one another on number of matters that have to do with the detail and application of *Jihād*. Many of the current *Salafiyah* scholars are of the view that there is no valid military *Jihād* in the absence of consent of an over-all Muslim leader (*Khalifah*) or alternatively a Muslim ruler in particular vicinity. Shaykh Fawzān, a prominent *Salafi* scholar, says thus: “ Also, it is inevitable that a *Jihād* should be mounted under the Muslim leadership and with the consent of the constituent authority; it (actually) falls under the responsibilities of the ruler.” (www.ajurry.com,2004).

This view has been countered by the *Ikhwān* scholars who argued that the implication of such verdict is tactical abolition of *Jihād* in current time. It is a known fact that virtually all the Muslim leaders in current time are major clients and allies of the enemy of Muslims; placing a monumental and sensitive matter like *Jihād* at their discretion is a green light for the final and practical burial of a basic fabric of Islamic teachings. (Yusuf, 2005). It is believed that the view of *Salafi* scholars is borne out of the traditional mentality that is ingrained in the classical works of jurisprudence produced in ancient Islamic state where the Muslim ruler was responsible for defending the territories of Muslims and their heritage. The application of that mentality to current Saudi context where the majority of *Salafi* scholars gave their verdicts may be closely accurate; but the mindset is likely to implicate the growth of Islam in nations whereby the fate of Islam lies in the struggles of individuals and organizations. Hence, such verdict is peculiar to places where there is a thriving system of Islamic governance. The active participation of most adherents of current *Salafiyah* in the practical *Jihād* has been blighted by the verdict; therefore leading us to another difference between the two schools which is disparity in the practical engagement in current *Jihād* struggles.

The Muslim Brothers are more active in *Jihād* engagement than the *Salafiyah* group. This is because their final goal as stated by the founder is to strive towards the emancipation of Muslim territories from foreign occupation

and domination, and this seems to be feasible only through the military engagement. There is much stress on *Jihād* in the literature of Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Bannā (1998) has challenged the members of *Ikhwān* in one of his public talk that they should fulfill the requirements of a *Mujāhid* and then ask him to lead the war. (p.188). The last phrase of the Brotherhood's motto is: "*Jihād* is our way and the death for the sake of Allah is our ambition". This vow has been put into practice by the members in the 1948 Palestine war. Infact the creation of the Secret Apparatus force in the beginning of 40s was aimed at actualizing the dream. In the 50s, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Syria sought the consent of the Syrian leader to participate and assist their fellow Muslim *Mujāhidūn* in Palestine. The demand was responsible for the jailing and persecution of most members then including their leader, Mustapha as-Sibā'ī. (Abdul Majīd, 2010, p.203). The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) fighting for the course of reclaiming the Muslim territories from the occupation of Israel is a Brotherhood's branch in Palestine. (p.204). The symbiosis between the Muslim Brotherhood and the *Mujāhidūn* of Palestine dates back to 1938 and hitherto no group among the current various Islamic groups has shown zeal and concern for the case of Quds as does the Brotherhood. In addition to the fore-going, the members of Muslim Brotherhood majorly constituted the think tank for the much celebrated success of the *Mujāhidūn* in the 1989 Afghanistan struggles against the occupation of Soviet Union. Although, there were also a crumb of *Salafi* elements, the struggle owes its success to the gigantic display of administrative and military management of Shaykh Hazzam, a member of the Brotherhood. (Bn Laden, 2011).

Against the fore-going, the *Salafiyyah* group, in current time have not been able to leave their marks on the various scenes that called for *Jihād* response. The last time there was a congregational *Jihād* of the Wahhabi – *Salafiyyah* was in 1932 which marked the termination of protracted wars of political conquests in Hijaz by the "Ikhwān", the title for the warriors of the Saudi House. (www.thesaudi-net). It is worthy of note that the said wars were even against the non-wahabi Muslims, loyal to the Ottoman empire. Henceforth, there had not been a remarkable active participation in *Jihād* under the watch of Saudi household. This has prompted some observers to hold that the British were responsible for the successful rise of Saudi kingdom consequent upon the Treaty of Darin. Be it as it may, the reluctant attitude of the kingdom towards the Palestine – Israel war has raised many dusts among the contemporary Muslims.

The recent declaration of HAMAS as a terrorist group by the Saudi led alliance has been taken as an attestant to the fact that there is a likelihood of secret pact and cliency between the Saudi Kingdom and America led western alliances. (<https://middleeastmonitor.com>,2018). The negative attitude of Wahhābi government in Saudi towards active *Jihād* has subjected her to pathological hatred primarily by the "Ikhwān" who were deceived by the Saudis that they were fighting a religious war against the Ottomani loyal Muslims and when it appeared that the wars were driven with pure political tendency as the *Jihād* could not continue against the British and Western enemy, the latter nursed a grudge against the former. The proceed of that grudge gave birth to 1989 siege of the sacred mosque in Makkah by the Utayban led group. (Huzaymi, n.d). Utayban was a descendants of the Bedouin *Ikhwān* and has inherited from his grand fathers grudge against the ruling household of Saudi. It also gave birth to the insurgence of Osama bn Laden, Al-Qaeda and other Muslim militant groups that have the ambition of combating the America led western influence in the Arabia gulf. It is therefore worthy of asserting that the rise of insurgency among the Muslim youths in current time is a product of irresponsible Muslim leadership that has ultimately failed in defending the overall interest of its people. The rise of Saudi Kingdom and other Arabian nations, to their responsibility of mounting the noble *Jihād* against the illegal and irrational intervention and occupation of Muslim territories by the west could have prevented the influx of un-surmountable insurgencies witnessed in current time throughout the Muslim globe. There is no doubt that the current insurgent groups have abused the goal of *Jihād* and have done much bad in tainting the reputation of Islam through incessant suicide bombings, destruction of government facility and infrastructures, shedding the blood of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims. They even often turn against one another because of lack of intellectual maturity, necessary exposure about the *Dīn* and youthful exuberance. Thus, the mournful scene has prompted many of *Salafi* scholars to ban individual engagement in *Jihād* for it usually ends up in uncontrollable problem. Ibn Uthaymin, a prominent *Salafi* Jurist says:

It is obvious that in our current time the Islamic warfare (seems) to be impossible because of the material and spiritual weakness of the Muslims; their failure to comply with causes of real divine intervention; and also because of being party to international treaties and pacts. Hence, calling to the way of Allah with exposure remains the only available means of Jihād. (www.ajurry.com).

Another discourse pertaining to *Jihād* that has polarized the view of the two groups is legality of *Jihād al-Hujūm* (offensive *Jihād*). Many of the *Salafi* scholars are of the opinion that even if the non-Muslims do not offend, it is a religious duty that attacks should be waged against them if they refuse to espouse Islam. (Qardāwi, 2009, vol.1 , p.452). They relied on what is popularly referred to as the verse of sword in the Qur'ān to corroborate their position of dismissing any peaceful co-existence with the non-Muslims unless the latter are ready to lose their faith or face humiliation. The sword verse reads thus;

And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists Wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give Zakah, let them (go) on their way. Indeed, Allah is forgiving and merciful. (Q9:5.)

Al-Luhaydān, a prominent Saudi *Salafi* scholar argues that this verse has abrogated other verses that provide otherwise, and that all the battles embarked upon by Prophet Muhammad were all offensive. (Qardāwi, 2009). Qardāwi and Al-Ghazālī who are among the most prominent scholars of the *Ikhwān* countered the previous view by asserting that the Prophet never fought offensively, rather all the battles embarked upon by the Prophet were defensive and combative against the oppression and persecution of the pagans. According to them, the sword verse is peculiar to the Arab pagans and various verses of the Qur'an have established the necessity of peaceful co-existence among the Muslims and non-Muslims. Prominent among such verses are Q2:192, Q8:61, Q2:193, Q9:12-13, Q22:39 and Q4:75. It is pertinent to note that the controversy over this matter is ancient. Even some *Salafi* scholars, such as Nāsirudeen Albāni, have maintained the view of the latter. It is also noteworthy that majority of *Salafiyyah* scholars that maintain the offensive nature of *Jihād* have ruled that current Muslims are not bound to execute the law since they are not capable materially and spiritually. Hence, the thrust of their argument is that offensive warfare is only allowed when the *Ummah* is very powerful. Even with this assumption, it gives justification for the current phobia being promoted by the media against the ascendancy of Muslims into world power. It is therefore note-worthy to condemn the faulty interpretation of the majority of *Salafi* scholars on this matter.

CONCLUSION:

The concept of *Jihād* is wider than the conventional perception of it as a military battle against the non-Muslim. The wrong perception emanates from the much jurisprudential elaboration and legal regulation attached to it by the Muslim Jurists.

The applicability of military *Jihād* and warfare in the current time has been ruled out by the *Salafiyyah* scholars through subjecting the exercise to acquisition of clear consent of the Muslim rulers. Although, the judgement is aimed at avoiding detrimental clash between the rulers and their subjects, it indirectly gives priority to the wish of the rulers above defending the over-all interest of the *Ummah*.

The *Ikhwān* scholars seem to correct the lacuna created by the *Salafi* verdict. They endorse any military struggle against the occupation of Muslim land and oppression of the Muslims by the foes in the absence of tacit approval of the rulers who seem to be heedless to the pains of the *Ummah*.

The combination of the judgement of the Muslim Brotherhood and the in-sensitivity displayed by current Muslim rulers to the pressing problems confronting the implementation of Islamic system in the Muslim nations gave birth to Islamic insurgency and militancy in the current time. Despite the justification of that phenomenon, the over-zealot youths have abused the exercise through unregulated bombings of civilians and causing instability in the Muslim world.

It is recommended that the only means for resolving the influx of insurgency and militancy among the current youths of Muslims is that the Muslim leaders should do the needful by heeding to the popular demands of the majority of Muslim nations which are expression of disloyalty to the sworn enemy of the Muslims; installing the Islamic system which is the cultural identity of their citizens and showing curiosity over defending the sanctity of *Sharī'ah*.

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